MAN OVERBOARD

Captain Michael Lloyd, FNI. (Senior Advisor, Seamanship International Ltd).

I remember the very first man over board situation I experienced. It was while I was a cadet on a ship in the Mediterranean. It was a pleasant day with a slight sea running, little wind. A seaman, working in a lifeboat which was stowed in the falls, fell back over the side. The call went up, which as the boats were located on the boat deck not far back from the bridge was heard. Not surprising, as the bridge was manned by the OOW, the Cadet of the watch, the Quartermaster on the wheel and a seaman lookout. The Radio Officer was also on watch in his office on the bridge. I was the cadet and detailed immediately to sound three long blasts on the whistle. This, apart from being the recognised signal to other ships for MOB, was also the ship’s MOB action stations signal. The OOW ordered the wheel hard over, which, as the wheel was manned was instant. The lookout let go the MOB lifebuoy and smoke marker. Responding to the signal on the whistle, the Captain had arrived on the bridge together with the 4th Officer and two other cadets, the two seamen designated as lookouts arrived picked up their binoculars and went to each wing of the bridge and took over the lookout from the bridge seaman. The Chief Officer, a Cadet and the boat lowering party were already assembled on deck; the boat was lowered to the boat deck and manned by the 3rd Officer Junior Engineer and 5 crew. The ship turned round, slowed down, the boat was lowered and went away while the ship was making around 5 knots using the boat rope to clear the ships side. The man was found clinging to the MOB buoy, hauled inboard and returned to the ship.

The whole incident took around 15 minutes, no one seemed particularly excited by it, the man was put into dry clothes, given a large tot of rum and in the afternoon was back working in the boat. Entries were made in the log book and that was that. So it should have been. Every voyage we practiced MOB with the boat being sent away at sea. In addition we used the boats regularly. Liberty boat, barbeques, beach parties and ship visits were all occasions to use the boats thus there was a seamanlike familiarisation with boatwork amongst all on board. The six cadets carried were all from training ships where they had been immersed in boatwork for two years, and the ships ratings were all intimate with boats. In addition the lifeboats were, although quite cumbersome, open boats and capable of being used for boatwork.
Similarly as a young Captain, we rescued several men from a boat that had sunk, finding them easily in comparatively good weather, with an open lifeboat.

Well, the sea has not changed, a phrase I find myself repeating more and more the older I become, but everything else has. On the good side is the fact that the safety culture now has managed to influence even the more recalcitrant skulls, and safety belts, non slip decks, coupled with a general acceptance that maybe it is not a good idea to have sailors dangling over the side in a force 9, has certainly reduced the incidents. However, while accepting that familiarity can tend to breed a certain amount of contempt, there are now many at sea who are not as familiar with the ship and seamanship as they should be. In addition, there always exist conditions when seamen have to go out on deck in bad weather. Individuals still do foolish things regardless of the technology surrounding them, thus, despite precautions, lectures, posters and safety departments, persons still have a habit of falling off the ship into the sea, and it is our job to bring them back, preferably alive..

The Present Predicament.

Today, unless the ship is leaving or entering harbour, the steering will be in Auto Pilot.

If it is day time and in open waters, the OOW will be the only person on the bridge; often at night too, if the truth be known. There is the requirement that during the day, if not on the bridge, then the duty seaman should be within instant call by the bridge but this rule is held more in abeyance than in observation on the basis that if the Fxl has a phone then he is within call. The chronic manning situation on many ships forces such interpretations.

The ship now is generally larger, the bridge is wider, wing doors often closed, thus not only will the shouts of man over board not be heard, but the dash out to the wings to release the MOB lifebuoys will be longer in a situation where every second counts.

The boats, unless you are lucky enough to have a purpose built rescue boat, are two enclosed lifeboats, one of which will, absurdly, be named the rescue boat, the only difference being that the davit motor is faster.
They will, in many cases, be stowed high up on the ship. Add this height to the possible height of a bulk carrier in ballast and the drop can be very high.

In addition, the modern ship has the lifeboats davits aft, as part of the accommodation housing. All too often, this means that the boats, when lowered, are, rather than being against the side of the ship, in considerable danger of being swept under the stern counter.

With such difficulties, purely in using the boat, you would expect that the expertise of the seamen and the officers to be better than in the past. Regrettably the seamanship training of present day ratings and officers could be called non existent in comparison with the past, being very basic with little boatwork knowledge or practical training.

Purely from these observations, a plethora of perceived problems arise in any attempted rescue venture, added to which is the sensible caveat of not endangering the lives of your men.
Regardless of all these difficulties, it is the duty of the Master to do all he can to rescue the person from the water to a place of safety. Further, the master must be able to demonstrate that he did all possible to affect such rescue.
Putting it bluntly, if the rescue is successful, all rules broken will be forgiven, even praised. If it is not, be sure that every decision and action will be pulled apart by every governmental deskbound mariner in the Flag State concerned, even to the requirement that you must have pulled the risk assessment and issued a work permit for lowering the boat!

Preparation.

The remark about the risk assessment is not as facetious as you might think. Regardless of your feelings about risk assessment, it is now so well established that it is not going to go away, and amongst the more junior officers, part of the normal seafaring culture. Many of us older masters tend to leave bits of paper to the officers but in this case it is worthwhile pulling the risk assessments and running through them. All too often, they will have been written by those before you, quite often by junior officers, but unless you amend them if required, you and your ship will be governed by what they say, and by having assumed command of the ship, you are responsible for ensuring their observance. Not much good leaving your disagreement with them until the Court of Inquiry.

Not only should you read the risk assessment but ensure all those concerned with a MOB situation read them as well. If there are any changes to be made, at least all will know of these and why and the assessment will be up to date.
At the same time, this provides the master with the opportunity of discussing with all the officers, especially the deck officers, the problems of MOB on that ship. Not only will this give the chance for all opinions to be evaluated, but present the master with the occasion for evaluating his officers in their responses to the difficulties. After all, if the second officer states that he has never been in a boat before and is frightened of the sea; this is not the man to cox the rescue boat even if the stations bill says it is his duty!

This discussion also allows the master to leave the officers in no doubt as to what he expects of them in such situation. Once all the opinions are listened to, accepted or dismissed, the framework of a plan can be established, taking into account all the factors such as the regulatory requirements and the limitations imposed by the ship and the equipment.
It would also be interesting to gauge your officers’ reactions to taking your boat away in differing sea states. From this you will have to scale your ideas on what to do.

Another most important preparation is knowledge of you own ship’s handing capabilities. Again, all too often we join a ship, sail around on it and leave, without really knowing how the ship handles in an emergency situation. This is not good enough if we are to call ourselves seamen. How fast will the ship turn at full speed with maximum helm? To what speed will the ship slow down during such turn? How will this turn affect the sea state alongside the launching area? Will two full turns calm the seas enough to launch? Can you bring the ship alongside an oil drum floating in the water and what is the best angle of approach? In all honesty, these are questions that you as master should be able to answer and can if you can spare a few hours to try this out. Really, no one can seriously question you taking a few hours after joining a ship to try these manoeuvres out, and just think, they could make the difference between saving or losing a life.

Out of interest, while playing with your ship, try a ‘Williamson Turn’, which is so beloved by certificate examiners. Rarely will it bring you back completely on track, nor should it as it was designed for very different types of vessels.

Out of interest the Williamson Turn was named for John Williamson , USNR, who used it in 1943 . However, according to Uncommon Carriers by John McPhee, the maneuver was originally called the "Butakov pipe" and was used in the Russo-Japanese War as a way of keeping guns at the same distance from an enemy. It could not have worked very well then either as the Russians lost that engagement. The Williamson Turn was most appropriate at night or in reduced visibility, when the position of the MOB was still close to the ship. For other situations, an Anderson Turn (Quickest method) or a Scharnow Turn could be used. The choices of which method to use often depended on the prevailing wind and weather conditions.

All three turns are interesting episodes from our seamanship history but, ever since Sat Nav positioning, giving us the ability to fix our position instantly, thus being able to con our vessel back to that position and then, if required, set a reciprocal course, they are now largely redundant. I am quite surprised that, as we no longer have to know the points of a sail or how to trim an oil lamp, the use of these turns are still required by certificate examiners and thus are taught extensively in the Nautical colleges. The problem with this is that there then continues to exist at sea the belief that these turns should be trotted out like some religious mantra with all the subsequent delay in any rescue operation. Even if the sat Nav is not working, the wake of the modern ship lingers sufficiently for a ship to be conned back into the path.

The final preparation of course is MOB avoidance. In the distant past, the Captain could quite happily sit in his deck chair with a gin and tonic and contemplate the golf course at the next port, safe in the knowledge that he had good professional seaman officers who could look after all seamanship matters without his interference. Happy days, long gone. Now, courtesy of STCW 95, you could well be the only real seaman on board. The OOW often becomes immersed in his screens or paperwork and because of his lack of on deck experience often forgets the need to watch the weather with relation to crew working areas. It is essential that the master gives detailed instructions as to what he will allow in what weather conditions. Equally, it behooves any prudent master to ensure that before the onset of bad weather, all deck fittings and cargo lashings are checked and secured. Better than having to send men out in the middle of a storm. In other words, prudent precautions that any good Chief Officer would make, but now the master has to check it is being done.

One last word on preparation and that is that it would be useful to know of the crew who can swim and who cannot. I am willing to wager that no Master reading this knows this fact about his crew. I certainly didn’t. If crewmembers can swim, they might be more confident in the rescue boat. In addition there could be a need for a strong swimmer to enter the water from the boat to assist the survivor.